In other words, the adoption of advanced technologies by a subset of firms may trigger broad improvements in a wide range of firms.
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This paper provides suggestive evidence for this magnification effect. Section 1 describes the data. Empirical regularities in section 2 suggest that advanced firms demand inputs from other advanced firms. Although these results are not new, they justify the selection of variables in section 3, where we provide evidence that firms that source inputs that are typically demanded by advanced firms are themselves more likely to adopt advanced technologies. This focus on firms that are only indirectly linked in the production chain, through a common input market, is novel. Section 4 concludes.
Data
We use the Colombian Annual Manufacturing Survey (AMS) of all manufacturing plants in Colombia with at least 10 employees. 3 Our results focus on 1988 but similar patterns hold for other years. For each plant, we observe total sales and measure a plant's import intensity as spending on imported materials divided by its total spending on materials.
Workers are classified into managers, technicians and non-technical production workers.
Our measure of skill intensity is the number of managers and technicians divided by the total number of employees. We use average wage per worker as additional information on a plant's skill level, under the assumption that firms observe skills better than us econometricians and pay higher wages for them. AMS is uniquely rich in recording quantities and values of all goods produced and of all materials used by 8-digit product categories. 2 As in Rodriguez-Clare (2007), increasing returns to scale must hold at the technology level, not at the industry level. Fieler, Eslava and Xu (2014) formalize this mechanism and embed it in a quantitative model of international trade. In the model, a firm's technology choice is interconnected with other changes within the firm and with other firms' technology choices through input linkages.
3 AMS includes some plants with fewer employees but with large value of production. For multi-plant firms, we take characteristics of the plant as indicative of the firm to which they belong. About six percent of plants are from multi-plant firms, but we do not observe to which other plants they are linked. 4 There are about 4,000 product categories that are roughly comparable to 6-digit HS codes.
Direct Input Linkages
We document the distinctive importing behavior of skill-intensive firms. The results complement previous work that shows that advanced firms source inputs from other advanced firms, strongly suggesting the connection between the technology choice of a firm and of its input providers. 5 While our results are not new, they justify the use of import intensity in section 3 below to construct a measure of relative demand for higher-technology inputs. We do not observe direct measures of technology level such as investments in better management practices, product and process innovation, information technology and R&D intensive equipment. Since it is well-known that these technological improvements strongly complement skilled labor, we follow the literature in interpreting skill intensity as proxies for technologies. 6 We also assume that imported inputs are more advanced than domestic inputs. Not only do advanced (foreign) firms self-select into exporting, but 
Indirect Input Linkages
Empirical strategy We provide suggestive evidence that firms that share a common input market have interconnected technology choices. Consider a positive technology shock to the auto-maker Mazda. Section 2 suggests that the shock directly increases the technology of Mazda's input providers, say steel producers. But the magnification effect of inputs occurs only if, through internal or external economies of scale, the overall quality of steel produced in Colombia increases, thereby increasing the technology of other firms that consume steel-e.g., other auto-makers, producers of household appliances and of capital equipment. This spillover from Mazda's steel providers to other firms consuming steel is the indirect effect.
Ideally, to pin down this effect, we would observe exogenous variation in demand for advanced inputs across product categories stemming from a subset of firms and study the effect of this variation on other firms' technology choices. Information on imported inputs gives us an imperfect proxy for this ideal variation. 7 For each product category, we take all the firms that buy material inputs from that category and calculate the share of those purchases that are imported. For each plant p, we calculate the weighted average of these import shares across the product categories of plant p's inputs. Denote this measure with M p . Based on table 1, our interpretation is that producers in categories with a high import intensity face a high demand for quality. Then, M p captures the demand for higher quality in the categories where plant p sources its inputs. Using plant-level data, we run regressions of the form:
where β are coefficients to be estimated, y p is either plant p's log of average wage per worker or skill intensity, ln sales p is the log of sales, imports p is either a dummy for whether plant p is an importer or the plant's import intensity, M p is as defined above, and ε p is a stochastic error.
We focus on across-sector variation because we do not observe much time variation. Questions on imports and exports were removed from AMS during the period of Colombia's trade liberalization, concentrated in 1991. We have not attempted a diff-in-diffs approach to our specification. 8 We control for log of sales because size can directly influence skill intensity due to managers' span of control (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)).
Results Table 2 reports the results of regression (1) with skill intensity as the dependent variable. Panel A contains the full sample. In the odd-numbered columns, the positive and significant coefficients on import share and import dummies indicate that importintensive firms are more skill intensive, as per table 1. But once the M p variable is introduced in the even-numbered columns these coefficients on imports p all go to zero.
That is, once we control for the type of inputs that the plant demands, through M p , then the plant's import behavior has no effect on its skill intensity.
The coefficient on M p is large and statistically significant in all specifications. For example in column 2, a 10% point increase in the import intensity of inputs typically demanded by a plant is associated with an increase in its skill intensity of 1.2% points.
The coefficient decreases when we introduce fixed effects for the output sector of plant p in columns 5 through 8. This result probably arises either because the variation in the choice of input categories across firms within the same output sector is small, or because competing against advanced firms in the output market dampens the incentives to invest in advanced technologies. Our interpretation for the positive coefficient on M p is as follows. Input providers in product categories with high import shares face a high demand for better products. To the extent that some of these input providers respond by upgrading their technologies, they increase the availability of better inputs, which in turn leads other firms that use these same inputs to upgrade their technologies.
Reverse causality is obviously also present. A technology shock (an increase in y p ) drives up the demand for better inputs and increases M p . But the results do not change in panel B where we restrict the sample only to importers, only to non-importers, or only to plants that neither import nor export. Since non-importers by construction cannot increase M p , reverse causality is unlikely to explain all the results. Panel B also partially addresses the concern that the results are driven purely out of self-selection of advanced firms into sectors that offer advanced inputs. If imported inputs directly increase the technology of importing plants, they give us a parallel to the ideal above of a technology shock in one subset of firms (importers) affecting another set of firms (non-importers) through a common input market. And if there is some randomness in the decision to import, the shock is imperfectly correlated with domestic factors influencing non-importers' technologies.
On table 3, we change the dependent variable to the log of average wage. Only two results change. First, the coefficients on M p are zero in the regressions with sector fixed effects-probably for the reasons cited above. Second on panel B, the coefficient on M p is larger for the sample of non-importers. This result makes sense under the input-magnification hypothesis. Importers should be less sensitive to the characteristics of domestic inputs because they already access high-technology inputs from abroad. Overall, we view our results as complementary to previous work and indicative of the magnification effect of technology choices through input-output linkages.
Conclusion
We provide suggestive evidence that technological advancements in some firms increase the technology of other firms indirectly linked to them in the production chain. Because technological improvements go hand in hand with other changes within firms, spillovers in technology choices have repercussions in the labor market and in patterns of specialization. Relevant applications are numerous: These spillovers may amplify the effects of international trade on technology choices and on the demand for skilled workers. They may shape the process of diffusion of a new technology, and influence the incentive for innovators to develop skill-biased technical changes. All regressions include sector-fixed effects and the log of plant sales. Standard errors are in parenthesis. * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05
Panel A: full sample 
